ABSTRACT

This paper critically examines how Islamist discourses have shaped and constructed cultural identity in the Middle East through gendered narratives and imaginaries. Providing an overview of the origins of Islamism in the region, it explains ideological roots of Islamist movements and the sociopolitical context of the 20th century that contributed to the resurgence of such movements. Focusing on the interplay between religion, politics, and social norms, the paper explores how Islamist movements mobilised a series of discourses to appeal to the public in the mid to late 20th century. The analysis highlights how gender norms and family roles become symbolic battlegrounds for competing visions of tradition, modernity, and national identity. Drawing on core discourses employed by Islamists across the region, the paper shows the ways in which Islamist rhetoric frames gendered identities to reinforce political agendas and social control, while also generating resistance and alternative feminist interpretations. By situating gender at the heart of Islamist cultural politics, this study contributes to broader debates on secularism, nationalism, and the politics of representation in the contemporary Middle East.

KEYWORDS: political Islam, Islamism, modernity, identity, discourse, gender, Middle East

INTRODUCTION

Over the past fifty years, Islam has reasserted itself not merely as a religion or cultural tradition, but as a powerful social movement and a political force. It has extended beyond the private and religious spheres to become, in many contexts, a dominant—if not the primary—actor in the public and political life of many Muslim-majority societies. As such, terms such as Islamism, radical Islam, and Islamic fundamentalism have become familiar to global audiences, particularly in the West, since the late 1970s and 1980s. These phenomena have been extensively examined across academic disciplines and political arenas, often in response to events such as the Iranian Revolution, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the global spread of Jihadi ideologies (Ayubi 1991; Cezari 2018, 2021; Gilles & Kepel 2022;Roy 1994; Kepel 1985, 2002, 2004).

These scholars have approached the study of Islamism through various lenses—historical, political, sociological, and theological—exploring its origins, ideological foundations, causes, and wide-ranging consequences at both local and global levels.

This paper focuses on how the resurgence of Islamism—or, to use a more neutral term, political Islam—over the past five decades has influenced identity discourses in the Middle East, with particular attention to its implications for gender norms and women’s representation. It begins by providing a contextual overview of Islamism and its diverse manifestations, tracing the modern historical trajectory of political Islam and the socio-political conditions that enabled its rise. It then turns to examine the intersection of religion and identity, analysing how Islamist movements have sought to monopolise narratives of cultural authenticity through religious frameworks. Finally, the paper reflects on how these discursive shifts have shaped gender dynamics and contributed to the portrayal of the region as prevalently Islamic.

Methodologically, this study employs a qualitative discourse analysis of popular speeches and slogans produced by influential Islamist figures and groups across the Middle East. These primary sources were selected because they capture moments of mobilisation where discourse functioned as a key instrument of legitimation and identity construction. Special attention is given to the institutionalisation of discourse in law and policy, particularly the codification of patriarchal interpretations of Sharia into personal status laws. Such legal frameworks extended symbolic narratives into state structures, rendering women’s legal dependency on men both naturalised and sacralised.

The analysis combines discourse analysis with contextual interpretation, situating Islamist narratives within broader processes of urban marginalisation, social dislocation, and anxieties of modernisation (Cesari 2021). It also engages with feminist scholarship (Ahmed 1992; Kandiyoti 1988; Mahmood 2005; Mir-Hosseini 1999; Moghissi 1999) to interrogate how women are simultaneously subordinated and valorised as central to sustaining the Islamist moral order.

ISLAMISM AND ITS ROOTS

Political Islam and Islamism are two terms used interchangeably to describe Islamic parties and movements that have risen to pre-eminence since the 1960s in opposition to secular states (Cesari 2021). The core ideological framework embraced by these movements conceive of Islam as a political ideology that can guide governance of the state and ultimately establish a society founded on Islamic teachings (Roy 1994 & Kepel 2002).

What is clear is that Islamism is a modern phenomenon. It is a modem political ideology and movement adopted by Muslims, both fundamentalists and moderates, and “predicated on the spread of Islamic laws and norms, whether through parliamentary or violent means” (Moghadam 2020, 102). 

While some Islamists, particularly the fundamentalist ones, are jihadist and resort for violence (e.g. ISIS or Al-Qaeda), the moderate Islamists (e.g. al-Nahda in Tunisia and Justice & Development Party in Turkey) believe in gaining power through participation in democratic political process. However, what both radical and moderate strands share is the adoption of Islam as an ideology and a source of political identity and legitimacy either within modern nation-states or at a transnational level (Cesari 2018).

As a modern political concept, Islamism began to take shape in the mid-20th century, primarily through the emergence of activist movements that sought to establish Islam as a comprehensive system for organising society and governance. Groups and organisations like the MuslimBrotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, and Jamaat-e-Islami, founded in Pakistan in 1941, are among the most prominent early expressions of this trend.

The origin of political Islam or Islamism in the Sunni Muslim world is mainly attributed to Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), the founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. However, its ideological roots can be traced back to eighteen and nineteen centuries and revivalist teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (1703–1792); if not Ibn Taymiyyah’s ideas in the thirteen century- two prominent Muslim thinkers. Central to the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah and Abd-al-Wahhab was an emphasis on purification of religion and a return to the practices of pious early Muslims or Salaf.

In addition, Islamism has been influenced by ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) who advocated for bringing modern concepts such as rationalism and anti-colonialism into Islam, and more directly by Salafi ideas of Rashid Rida (1865–1935).

In explaining how these network of ideas worked together to form political Islam, it can be said that political Islam has mainly borrowed its religious fundamentalism/purification from Wahabism and Salafism, its political activism and mobilisation- Pan Islamism- against West from modern reformism of Afghani and Abduh, and its political doctrine for Islamic governance from Salafi revivalism of Rida. These religious thinkers and activists reformed the Islamic tradition in order to address challenges of political modernisation brought by the encounters with Europe (Cesari 2021). This is what Afshari (1994, 13) refers to as “a sense of political urgency and identity crisis” that have existed among generations of Muslim since the emergence of modernity.

As it can be understood, Islamism is constructed on two main grounds; one is fundamentalism and revival of Islamic glory of the early Caliphates, and the other is modern anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist activism (Roy 1994)

Similarly, revolutionary Shi’a political movements, particularly those inspired by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran and Baqir al-Sadr in Iraq, while doctrinally distinct from their Sunni counterparts, shared the foundational belief that Islam offers a totalising framework for political and social order. As Roy (1994) notes, despite sectarian differences, both sects converge on the conviction that Islam is not merely a religion but a system meant to govern all aspects of life. Shia Islamism has its deep roots into the political history of Islam especially the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala (680 CE)- the grandson of Prophet Mohammad- which has been symbolised resistance against oppression and tyranny for thousands of years. This event has been a prominent source of strength and mourning for Shai Muslims who commemorate it annually during the month of Muharram.

MODERNITY ARRIVING IN THE REGION

The resurgence of Islam as a political ideology in the early 20^th century and its emergence as a political force in the 1970-80s is seen by many scholars as a response to an array of internal and external factors such as colonialism/imperialism, nationalism/modern nation-building, and Western modernisation and secularisation. What can certainly be true is that returning to Islam as a resort and refuge by many Muslims was the outcome of facing a world rapidly changing or to put it another way, the collapse of the old world order and the birth of a new unknown world (Roy 1994; Kepel 2002).

It was in the mid to late 19^th century that the idea of modernity entered the region and initiated a process that gradually transformed the face and character of the Middle Eastern countries. The early wave of modernisation in the region was characterised by revisiting ways of thinking and living, constitutionalism, and parliamentarism sweeping the region from Turkey to Iran (Persia) and Egypt (Halpern 2015; Goldschmidt,1979)

Leaders such as Muhammad Ali Pasha (1805-1848) and Ismail Khedive in Egypt (1863- 1879); Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839), Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1839- 1858) and Ali Pasha (1850–1871) in Turkey, Abbas Mirza (1789–1833) and Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir (1807–1852) in Iran were early modernist figures in the region.

These pioneering leaders began modernising their countries with reforming/advancing armies, centralising power, and establishing modern educational centres. Early modernisation in Egypt primarily focused on military and economic reforms—building railways, factories, and irrigation/agricultural systems. In Turkey, the emphasis was more on legal and administrative reforms- the Tanzimat. Meanwhile, in Iran, modernisation centred mainly on military and educational initiatives, including the establishment of Dar al-Fonoun (a college). Through such reforms in the region, the path opened for constitutionalism and parliamentarism that came in early 1900 (Badran 1996; Goldschmidt 1979).

During the 19th century, Egypt under Muhammad Ali Pasha and Ismail Khedive went through a significant secularisation process particularly through bringing education and law – two areas of religious monopoly – under the control of the state. While commercial, civil, and criminal codes became secularised, the personal status law remained under religious jurisdiction leaving women to struggle with the consequences of living under patriarchal constraints and systemic inequality  (Badran 1996).

Ataturk in Turkey and Raza Shah in Iran were two other main figures who boldly continued modernising efforts of their predecessors through literacy projects, building universities, and economic infrastructures as well as cultural reforms emphasising Secularism. Such reforms could be considered as main drivers of Islamist growth- in the first half of the twentieth century. Islamists used the so-called evil impacts of modernisation as their main reason for opposing the state and calling the public to mobilise, while at the same time taking advantage of opportunities—such as railroads and newspapers—provided by modernisation to spread their message. Hassan al-Banna, founder of Muslim Brotherhood, for example, used to travel across Egypt by train meeting his supporters at stations and giving speeches from town to town (Ketchley, Brooke, and Lia 2022).

Obviously, modernising projects in the region also had their flaws and shortcomings. While reforms were constructive in some areas, they were detrimental to some groups within the society. For example, Ismail khedive’s construction of Suez Canal -while grand and a source of national pride- was viewed as extravagant by many placing extra burden on poor people and plunging the country into significant debt, which ultimately led to British and French’s interference in Egypt (Goldschmidt 1979).

Similarly, cultural modernising projects of Ataturk and Reza Shah, which were significant steps towards Secularism and advancement of women’s rights- were perceived as top-down and overly harsh, threatening the more traditional and conservative segments of the Turkish and Iranian societies and pushing them towards Islamists.

Nonetheless, modernising projects continued across the region in the mid 20th century and were fuelled by the decolonisation of many Arab countries, nationalist ideologies such as Pan-Arabism and Pan-Turkism, and the discovery of oil. This period of heightened modernisation and industrialisation brought about rapid sociopolitical and economic developments in Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and other newly established Arab nation-states. Science, culture, art and music were flourishing across the region and attracting tourists and foreign investors. Cities like Cairo, Beirut, Istanbul, Tehran became vibrant hubs of intellectual exchange and artistic innovation, reflecting a spirit of modernisation. Governments invested in infrastructure and education, while cultural festivals, film industries, and musical productions were abounding.

One of the main outcomes of these rapid changes sweeping the Arab and Muslim societies in the Middle East and North Africa was women entering the public spheres. Middle Eastern women who, until then, were mainly associated with the privacy of homes began to show their unveiled faces in the streets of Cairo, Tehran, Istanbul, Beirut, and even small towns.

In a country like Iran where its first ever girls’ public school opened in early 20^th century (1907) in Tehran was shot down within a few months under threats from Ulama (Islamic clergies) and conservative segments of the society, twenty years later in 1930s, girls were attending universities and working as teachers, nurses, writers, and journalists. Similarly, in the area of personal status law, the marriage of girls under the age of 15 was banned—a significant improvement in Iran where girls were previously married off as young as 9 years old (Moghissi 2020). In Egypt and Turkey, the first public schools and higher education centres for girls opened approximately thirty years earlier in the 1870s, marking the initial stages of women’s entry into public spaces. 

Not only did women gain greater opportunities for public presence and access to education, but women’s rights activists were also pushing for legal and political rights. Consequently, women earned their right to vote across the region and began standing for and being elected to parliament and other public offices from 1930s to 1960s (beginning with Turkey 1930 then Lebanon 1952, Syria 1953, Egypt 1956, and Iran 1963).

These unprecedented advances, however, faced significant backlash from religious conservatives and Islamists groups who opposed governments’ decisions on women’s rights. They fervently pushed back against unveiling, co-education, and political participation of women viewing them ‘un-Islamic’. Tragically ironic, Islamist figures such Khomeini in Iran – who condemned women’s suffrage and regarded their participation in parliament as ‘moral corruption’ and even akin to ‘prostitution’ in his speeches – went on to gain public support and ultimately rule the country in 1979.

To counter such ‘un-Islamic’ moves, which they considered as influences of ‘corrupt West’, Islamists across the region- whether Sunni or Shai-  advocated a return to the roots of religion (Cesari 2021; Hashemi 2023).

Another important irony to note is that, despite Islamists’ strong disdain for the West, they usually acted as allies of the West during the cold war – due to the shared enmity towards Communism, and Western powers supported them against Soviet influence in Egypt, Syria, South Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran (Kepel 2002).

SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN 20^TH CENTURY

As explained above, the 1920s marked a crucial period for the emergence of Islamist movements. During this time, modernity had arrived in the region, the Ottoman Empire collapsed after World War I, and nationalist ideas alongside anti-colonial efforts gained significant momentum across the area (Brooke and Ketchley 2018).

All these factors contributed to the rapid growth of Islamists and the support they received from the public. Confronted with the perceived threat of modernity — Westernisation, Secularisation, and Materialism — invading local culture and traditions, many people across the region welcomed Islamism as an authentic and familiar form of resistance they knew.

The collapse of a five-hundred-year-old empire created a power vacuum where modern nationalists and Islamists were fighting over to fill. With religious zeal and scepticism towards the new concept of nationalism – it being considered as a Western concept-, many in the communities turned to Islamism as a path to self-determination and authority  (Baban 2018; Calvert 2009)

For example in Egypt before the independence, the Muslim Brothers were rivals of nationalist movements in struggles against the British and competitions over post-colonial Egyptian state. While nationalists hoped for a European models, the Muslim Brothers endeavoured for an Islamic state founded on Islamic teachings and the Koran as its constitution.

Therefore, though Islamist movements did not gain political power until the 1970s, their foundations were laid in the early 20^th century. Inspired by the above doctrines, Islamist movements in the first decades of the twentieth century started to mobilise people across the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. Muslim Brotherhood as the most prominent of Islamist movements not only boasted more than 50 branches across Egypt in the first decade after its foundation, but also opened branches in Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, and other Arab and Muslim countries (Brooke and Ketchley 2018; Ketchley et al. 2022).

Another crucial event that contributed to the rise of Islamism in the Arab countries was the devastating military defeats endured by Arab states in the 1967 war with Israel and its impact on Arab societies. That defeat, along with earlier setbacks in 1948 and later ones in 1973 and 1982, brought Arab nationalism—which was largely secular and modern whether it was inclined towards Liberalism or Communism —and the hopes for Pan-Arabism to an end. In this atmosphere of disillusionment and despair, Islamist movements emerged without serious rivals, positioning themselves as the only viable alternative and a source of hope and pride for wounded egos of Arab societies (Knudsen 2003). 

It was in such circumstances that, in late 20^th century, the trajectory of modernisation was abruptly reversed, and Islamist groups gained prominence and seized power across the region. Since then, Islamists have imposed their narrative and desired picture of the Middle East on the people of the region using both force and soft power. Despite the passing of time and all the splits among Islamist groups and movements over a century, there have been a shared set of ideas and frameworks as well as social and historical conditions that shape how these groups think and act (Roy 1994).

I will examine identity politics in the Middle East and analyse how Islamist movements have successfully shaped the region’s identity discourse.

IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Despite the common Orientalist perception about the homogeneous Muslim Middle East, identity is one of the most complex concepts to tackle when discussing the Middle East and North Africa. While the region is predominantly Muslim and largely known as such, it encompasses a mixture of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and sectarian identities; ethnic identities of Turks, Arabs, Persians, Kurds and Berbers; religious identities of Muslims, Jews, and Christians; and sectarian identities of Sunnis, Shias, Alawites, Druzes, Maronites, Copts, to name a few (Baban 2018; Hinnebusch 2016; Haddad 2020; Haddad, Hintz, Majed, Matthiesen, Salloukh, and Siegel 2022; Kumaraswamy 2006).

Being the cradle of some of the most ancient civilisations, birthplace of several ancient religions, and located at the crossroads of East and West, the region has long been characterised by Ethno-Linguistic and Sectarian diversity.  This diversity has at times sparked wars and conflicts, and at other times fostered peaceful coexistence—largely depending on who rules the territories and how they govern.

However, the emergence of the modern concepts of nationalism and nation-states in the 19th century complicated this picture. Until then, people often identified themselves primarily through tribal, geographical, or religious affiliations. From the 19th century onward, the notion of national identity began to take root in the region—particularly among groups with a long history of living together under a common empire or civilisation, such as Egyptians, Turks, and Iranians/Persians.

This evolving sense of national identity set the stage for complex identity politics, where various actors—states and political groups alike—have sought to leverage ethnic, linguistic, religious, sectarian, and gender identities to secure power, representation, and legitimacy. In the Middle East and North Africa, with their rich diversity, intertwined regional rivalries, and external influences, the project of forging a unified, let alone homogeneous, national identity has often faced significant challenges and limitations.

As Hinnebusch, (2016) mentions, in places where national identity aligns with shared territory and economic interdependence, it can lead to the formation of a legitimate and stable nation-state. As such, in most parts of the Middle East, the incongruency between the formal state borders and the identity of the people has resulted to high levels of conflict. This is especially the case for recently formed Arab nation-states with their national borders fragmenting ethno-linguistic groups and strong rivalry of religious identities with national identity (Baban 2018).

In countries like Turkey, Iran, and Israel, however, the nation-building project has been smoother and closer to the modern nation-state models. This is mainly due to the long histories of these countries in case of Iran and Turkey or the alignment of the borders with ethno-linguistic groups in Israel and Turkey (Hinnebusch 2016).

Arab nationalism formed on a shared language and culture raised strongly after the collapse of the Ottoman empire fuelled by anti-imperialist sentiments and a desire for a unified Arab nation. As a secular modern movement, Arab nationalism was promoted by modernising progresses across the Arab world. As Hinnebusch (2016) states, improvements in education, the influence of Egyptian teachers across the Arab world who helped shape the emerging middle classes, and the widespread use of the transistor radio—which connected the Arab public—all played important roles in fostering a sense of unity among Arabs.

Arab nationalism as the ideology of educated elite Arabs was successful in gaining the appeal of masses in the Arab countries in the mid 20^th century; however, from the onset, it was challenged by traditional and local groups opting for either religious/sectarian or tribal identities. Apart from the fact that, in countries with strong Islamic identities like Egypt, nationalism has always had an Islamic aspect, it is important to note that, in the Arab countries, Islamist and national movements often had shared causes and grievances such as their struggle with colonisation, imperialism, and Israel (Hinnebusch 2016).

Despite the existence of a deep religious identity, secular Arab nationalism – mainly associated with Jamal Abd al-Nasser (Egypt’s president in 1956-1970) and his Pan Arabism ideology- was the dominant form identity in the Arab world overshadowing Islamist and even state identities in the 1950s to 1970s.

As mentioned in the previous section, the defeat of the main Arab nationalist states by Israel in 1967 made the failure of the idea of Arab collective identity and security clear and marked the end of Pan-Arabism. This was exacerbated by the death of Nasser, hero of Pan-Arabism, in 1970 and internal rivalries and conflicts among Arab states.

One of the main consequences of decline of Arab nationalism or Pan-Arabism was a rise in identification with Islamic and states identities compared to Arab identity among people with more than 70 percent choosing Muslim identity over state or Arab identities in the World Values Survey in 2010–12 as reported by Hinnebusch (2016). Similarly, a 2013 study by the Pew Research Center found that 74 percent of Egyptians believe Sharia should be the official law, with the same percentage agreeing that it should apply to both Muslims and non-Muslims (Wormald 2013).

In line with those findings, Kumaraswamy (2006) argues that all the countries of the Middle East have prioritised a religion-centric identity; whether through states’ policies or religious movements and groups’ efforts to replace other forms of identity and become the pre-eminent national identity. Though Turkey was excluded from this trend at that time, currently, there seems to be no exception in that regard.

This means that political Islam has been successfully integrated into modern political identities of Arab nations making many Muslim people believe that the politics and the state should adhere to rules of Islam (Cesari 2021).

In the next section, I will examine discourses used by Islamist groups across the Middle East to promote their ideologies, gain legitimacy, and monopolise the identity and representation in the region since 1970 and 1980s.

ISLAMISTS’ USE OF DISCOURSE TO SHAPE IDENTITY IN THE REGION

Using the identity crisis and power vacuum created by the perceived failure of Arab nationalism in Arab societies and the states’ favouritism towards Islamist groups in countries like Iran, Egypt, and Turkey, Islamist groups intensified their efforts to appeal to their societies. These Islamists, who had sown the seeds for their ideologies since the beginning of the century through religious, social and even academic work, found circumstances of 1970s and 1980s most favourable to their cause.

In the cold war atmosphere of the 1970s, the fear of Marxism was so great that states in many countries softened their pressure on Islamists to counter leftists. In Egypt, Anwar Sadat freed Muslim Brothers from prisons. Similarly, in Iran and Turkey, states opened the space for Islamists while tightening their reign on Marxist groups (Moghadam 2020). In addition, enjoying the moral high ground afforded by their position in opposition, Islamists’ rejection of secular ideologies, the prevailing political order, and Western policies toward the Middle East resonated strongly with the masses (Hashemi 2023).

The sociopolitical and historical factors contributing to the rise of Islamism in the region are numerous and deeply interconnected; ranging from sociocultural openness associated with modernisation to political repression of authoritarian states as well as  economic grievances and military failures and foreign interferences. Nonetheless, it is evident that Islamists were able to surpass other dominant elite political ideologies of the time—namely liberal nationalism, which was rooted in the ethno-linguistic identities of Arabs, Turks, and Persians, and Marxism, which focused on class struggle and economic justice.

Unlike these two ideologies, which were regarded as foreign imports and often associated with imperialism and colonialism, Islam was deeply rooted in the region’s cultures and societies. This made it relatively easy for Islamists to gain public support, especially if they could convince the masses that Islam could address not only their spiritual and afterlife matters but also their worldly needs. The mission of the Islamists, therefore, became to present Islam as the ultimate solution to the people’s grievances. In a sociopolitical context marked by despair, disillusionment, and widespread frustration, this narrative resonated easily.

Given that Islam has always been a political religion. In the context of the modern nation-states, Islamist thinkers were able to frame Islam as a comprehensive political doctrine capable of structuring both governance and social relations. They could appeal to both nationalist aspirations of masses for unity and independence and their ideals of economic justice.

As such, it’s not surprising that the main discourses Islamists used to promote their ideology have been discourses of Unity (Islamic Umma or Pan-Islamism), Social Justice and Welfare, Moral Purity and Anti-Corruption, Anti-Westernism and Anti-Colonialism, and Family Values and Protection.   

From Khomeini and Khamenei in Iran, to Erbakan and Erdoğan of the Welfare and Justice and Development Parties in Turkey; from Nasrallah of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Sheikh Ahmed Yassin of Hamas in Palestine, to al-Tilmisani of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Zawahiri of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Egypt, and Rached Ghannouchi of al-Nahda in Tunisia—Islamist leaders employed similar discourses to position their identity politics and gain legitimacy and power across the region.

In Iran,some of the prominent discourses used in speeches of the Islamist leaders and slogans of the Islamic revolutionincluded:Islam the religion of the oppressed; Islam the religion of justice; the revolution for the poor; neither East nor West, but the Islamic Republic.

Similarly in Egypt, slogans such as Islam is the solution; Quran is our constitution; Islam the religion of the poor; our leaders steal, Islam feeds the hungry were widely used by Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups.

In Turkey, Moral revolution over materialism; Islamic unity, not Western dependency; we are the grandchildren of the Ottomans; Sharia will come, oppression will end; the atheist state will surely be demolishedhighlighted Islamists’ attempt to appeal to people through positioning Islam as bringing the ultimate moral values for the society and restoring religious unity and glory.

In places like Lebanon and Palestine where the struggle against the Israeli enemy was more prominent, in addition to the above, the discourses were also built around resistance, martyrdom, and the Muslims vs. Jews/Zionists.

In all these discourses, Islam was represented as the only answer to grievances of the people bringing social justice, overcoming class struggles of the poor, and offering an authentic local alternative to the foreign ideologies. As explained by Baban (2018), Islamist groups started to mobilise specifically in marginalised urban areas populated by flow of migrants from rural areas and smaller towns. These people newly settled in cities usually faced discrimination and often felt alienated and neglected by the process of national integration. Islamist groups and organisations were quick in using such discontents to attack governments and appealing to these marginalised groups by providing them with a range of social services. Across many societies, Islamists’ core message was consistent in challenging the secular foundations of national governments and presenting Islamisation of the state as the solution.

They offered a full package responding to all political, cultural, social, and economic concerns and injustices. The belief that Islam was the most truthful and comprehensive model for salvation had already been ingrained in people’s minds for centuries. Therefore, it was convenient to rally millions of Muslim believers by framing their misfortunes as the result of their societies’ and states’ loss of Islamic essence, and by positing that their redemption lay in reestablishing Islam as the foundational basis of the state.

Such discourses were promoted through slogans, speeches, graffities, and articles at social gatherings, demonstrations, mosques, media and even elite circles and universities across the region. As Cesari (2021) explains,  this is the process through which political Islam employs discourse – religiousreferences, themes, symbols, and institutions – in its interaction with the modern concepts and institutions – state, nationalism, governance, newspaper, and public law to gain legitimacy and power.

IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN

As mentioned by Ayoubi (1991), Islam conceives of morality as a public matter and places emphasis on the ‘collective enforcement of public morals’. As such, one of the central discourses frequently employed by Islamists has revolved around family values and protection, particularly emphasising the role of women in maintaining these values and structures for the betterment of the society. Such discourses have attempted to re-impose modesty and traditional gender norms on women (Kandiyoti 1988; Abu-Lughod 1998; Moghissi 1999; Mir-Hosseini 1999, 2019; Mahmood 2005). 

The protection of the family—and by extension, the protection of society and the Islamic Umma from foreign influences—has been a core element of Islamic revivalism. Feeling threatened by the arrival of modernity at Muslim lands, Islamic thinkers since the 19th century have focused on shielding their societies from what they perceived as a cultural invasion. From the perspective of many Islamic scholars, the most dangerous impact of modernity was on the cultural fabric of Muslim societies, especially in regard to gender norms and family structures. Scholars such as Ahmed (1992) and Mernissi (1991) have extensively analysed how modernisation challenged patriarchal structures and traditional gender roles in Muslim societies. The reshaping of family dynamics as a consequence of urbanisation, modern educational system, legal reform, and other manifestations of modernity have led to a sense of urgency and identity crisis among many Muslim clergies and thinkers (Afshari 1994).

As the patriarchal nature of most Muslim societies left little room for changes that could challenge the gender hierarchy within the family, a significant portion of Islamist campaigns has centred on defending and promoting traditional gender roles and family values. Islam had already established strict and detailed norms governing family structure, relationships, and responsibilities, and Muslim families had long followed and upheld those norms.

In response to the perceived threat from the West—embodied in modernity—Islamists across the region made it their mission to reinforce Islamic values by emphasising the centrality of the family in Islam and the essential role of women within it. To advance this goal, they promoted a powerful discourse: Women as the Moral Guardians of Islamic Society (Umma). This narrative placed the burden of protecting society from foreign invasion and moral decline on the shoulders of women. 

Ironically, women—who had long been portrayed in dominant Muslim discourses as physically weak and intellectually inferior- using terms such as Za’ifa [ضعیفه], Naqisaat [ناقصه], and Awrat [عورت] —were now elevated to the role of heroines, tasked with safeguarding their families and, by extension, the entire Umma. Through this discourse and its various interpretations, women were represented as active moral agents within their societies (Badran 1996; Mahmood 2005; Hoodfar 1997; Kandiyoti 1988).

However, paradoxically, to carry out this important responsibility, women were expected to limit themselves to traditional roles within the domestic sphere, or adhere to strict modesty codes when participating in public life.

Revolutionary motherhood promoted by the Islamic state in Iran is one example of such agency roles ascribed to women. During the Islamic Revolution, women were called upon to become active agents by raising a generation of devout Muslims committed to defending and advancing Islam. As Mir-Hosseini (1999) has shown, the new Islamic regime redefined women’s public roles through a religious lens, presenting motherhood as a form of jihad and national duty. One of the most disturbing consequences of this ideological mobilisation occurred in the 1979 and 1980s, when mothers of some political dissidents—mainly leftists accused of atheism—turned their own children in to the revolutionary authorities. Convinced they were fulfilling their religious obligation and ensuring the salvation of their children, these women enabled execution of their children under the illusion of moral righteousness.

This tragic consequence exemplifies what Moghissi (1999) identifies as the manipulation of religious and maternal values by Islamist regimes to suppress dissent and reinforce patriarchal control. It also resonates with Mahmood’s (2005) critique of how agency, when defined solely through resistance, fails to account for the deep internalisation of religious and moral frameworks that can lead women to participate in oppressive systems with sincere conviction.

Islamists in Turkey, Egypt, and other Muslim societies practice a similar method; representing women as the child bearers and educators. Motherhood was glorified not only as a family responsibility but also as a Jihad, a prominent social and religious task. 

Another aspect of representing women as Guardians of the Muslim societies have been hijab and modesty discourses. Slogans such as Hijab is our pride; Hijab is our identity; the veil is obedience to God, not oppression; and our culture is Islamic, not Western have beenwidely used by Islamistsacross the region and beyond.

In Iran of late 1970s and early 1980s, many women, inspired by revolutionary discourses, voluntarily adopted the veil (before its enforcement by law in 1983). Even some elite women—regarded as pioneers of women’s empowerment and prominent literary or academic figures—voiced support for veiling once the Islamists rose to power. When asked about the implications of mandatory veiling and other restrictions on women, many of them echoed patriarchal narratives, suggesting that women’s issues were secondary to the Revolution’s greater mission: saving the nation and bringing justice. This reflects how revolutionary ideology often subsumed gender concerns under the broader goals of national and religious salvation. This is similar to what Mahmood (2005) highlights about women in the Egyptian mosque movement viewing the hijab not as coercive, but as a self-cultivating practice of piety — a voluntary act aligned with inner moral development.

This trend was not limited to Iran. Across countries like Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and others, many Muslim women who had never worn the hijab—even into their 40s or 50s—suddenly began veiling. Despite the fact that hijab was not legally mandatory in these contexts (unlike in Iran), this shift reflects the powerful societal pressures and widespread ideological campaigns promoted by Islamist movements. These developments reveal how veiling, though formally a personal choice, became heavily influenced by the moral narratives, social expectations, and cultural propaganda constructed and disseminated by Islamists across the region (Abu-Lughod 1998; Eltahawi 2015).

Resistance to this trend often carried consequences—not always in the form of direct state punishment, as seen in post-revolutionary Iran, but through powerful social sanctions. Women who chose not to veil were frequently viewed as immodest or morally suspect, accused of endangering families and corrupting the youth. As explained above, the hijab came to signify far more than a personal choice or religious duty; it became central to women’s perceived responsibilities as guardians of Islamic morality and social order and a political symbol and a visible manifestation of ideological commitment, cultural identity, and moral order.

As Ahmed(1992) argues, the hijab has been repurposed in modern Islamist movements to signal both resistance to Western cultural imperialism and adherence to a divinely ordained social order. Such portrayals of women as ‘bearers of authentic culture’ in opposition to imported Western culture has functioned as a mechanismof control (Al-Ali 2000). Moghissi (1999) similarly emphasises how post-revolutionary Iran transformed the veil into a tool of state control, where women’s clothing became a measure of loyalty to the Islamic Republic.

The consequences of the widespread Islamisation of the region for women does not limit to constraints on personal freedom and imposing of the Hijab. One of the most crushing impacts of Islamists dominating societies and sociopolitical institutions has been widespread legal inequality that women have been struggling with on a daily basis. From the right to child custody and guardianship to divorce and employment, women continue to be subordinated to their husbands in nearly all Muslim countries.

The principal discourse employed by Islamists to legitimise the subordination of women in family law is grounded in the notion of equal but different. Within this framework, injustices inflicted upon women in personal status law—such as being denied the right to initiate divorce, to claim child guardianship, or being required to obey their husband in nearly all aspects of life —are reframed as expressions of differences and division of responsibilities rather than as manifestations of inequality.

As Mir-Hosseini (1999, 2019) argues, in many Muslim-majority countries, Islamic legal frameworks have been selectively codified in ways that systematically subordinate women—especially in areas such as marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and guardianship.

Suchinstitutionalisation of Islamist ideologies through Islamic legal frameworks has made it incredibly difficult to do legal reforms in Muslim countries, as any challenge to male guardianship or gender hierarchy is framed as an attack on religion. As such, in nearly all Muslim countries—women remain legally dependent on their husbands or male relatives in matters related to their children, employment, and movement (Moghissi 1999). It is in response to such institutionalisation of Islamic law that Ahmed (1992) challenges the apologetic claim made by many Muslims that it is culture, rather than religion, that oppresses women.

Even in more secularised systems, such as Jordan or Morocco, personal status law is heavily shaped by Sharia. Tunisia stands as a rare exception, where post-independence reforms established a civil code that granted women greater equality in matters of divorce, custody, and inheritance—though even there, pressures for re-Islamisation persist.

These legal structures not only restrict women’s agency but also reflect a broader Islamist discourse that situates women’s rights within a patriarchal moral order, where female autonomy is subordinated to family stability and male authority. The daily struggles women face—navigating discriminatory courts, limited divorce rights, and employment barriers—are thus part of a wider system legitimised through religious symbolism and political power; a system that enforces male authority while reducing many of women’s rights to ethical recommendations (Ahmed 1992).

All in all, it was through such a process that Islamist movements reclaimed the face and soul of the region, steering it away from its earlier modernisation trajectory. In doing so, they reshaped political, cultural, and social life into what is now widely recognised as a predominantly religiously oriented Islamic society

Conclusion

It was within a heavy socio-political context of the early to mid-20^th century—marked by the arrival of Modernity, collapse of Ottoman empire, nationalism and anti-colonial struggles, and widespread identity crisis—that Islamists took root, and the face of the Middle East began to change dramatically. What had started to become relatively open and pluralistic societies, where men and women could mingle freely in universities, cultural institutions, and public life, increasingly turned into more ideologically partitioned environments.

As Al-Ali (2000) notes in the case of Egypt, the rise of Islamist groups led to a cultural shift in which modesty and gender segregation became normalised in public discourse, even without state enforcement. Similarly, in Iran, as shown by Moghissi (1999, 2020) and Mir-Hosseini (1999), the Islamic revolution restructured social space around gendered moral boundaries, turning mixed spaces into zones of ideological and physical control. Even in countries like Turkeyand Lebanon, where secular traditions had been stronger, Islamist influence—through grassroots activism, media, and religious revivalism—contributed to the growing redefinition of gender roles and public behaviour.

These changes were not always mandated through law, but often enforced through social pressure, symbolic language, and moral discourse. As Mahmood (2005) argues in her study of Egypt’s women’s piety movements, such transformations must be understood not merely as top-down impositions, but as complex negotiations where women themselves played a role in embodying and reproducing Islamist norms.

Such a shift from open, secular-oriented spaces to segregated and ideologically charged public spheres signalled a profound transformation in the region’s gender dynamics and cultural politics in the late 20^th and early 21^st century. However, in the last two decades, we have witnessed another shift towards secularisation across the region. Women’s activism has asserted itself within the conservative social structures that seek to limit its agency. From the Arab Spring to Women, Life, Freedom, women have not only mobilised in large numbers but have also been leading  movements towards democracy and secularisation. Many scholars, women’s rights activists, and ordinary women alike are actively resisting the imposition of Islamic norms and laws on their personal and public lives, challenging both state-led Islamisation policies and informal social pressures. Such resistance ranges from total rejection of patriarchal application of Islamic doctrine by secular activities and scholars likeRoksanaAfshari (1994), Haideh Moghissi (1999, 2007, 2012),Nawal-ElSaadawi(2007), and Mona Eltahawi (2015, 2019) to re-interpretation of Islamic texts in egalitarian and rights-based approaches by Islamic feminists such as Fatima Mernissi (1987, 1991) Leila Ahmed (1992), and Amina Wadud (1999, 2006).

Acknowledgement

There is no conflict of interest to declare. AI Tool (Chat GPT) has been used for editing purposes.

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